What are the similarities of those two ideas?
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Order Paper NowI need help or a second thought regarding a question in English literature theory. The two extracts below share the same idea of “Subjectivity” in which they both poses the same instinctual behaviours. The task basically has to answer the following questions:
(Make bullet points to answer, for each question)
1- What are the key concepts for each extracts? (2 or 3 for each extract are enough)
2-Identify the similarities and the differences of the two extracts?
3-How the two extracts are connected?
Language and grammar aren’t really important at this stage, however its a deep and intellectual literary task which require an enough knowledge of the subject, so please don’t show interest if you don’t have a solid grasp about the question. You have to engage with the extracts below and read it carefully to answer.
Having someone else to give me their opinions on the subject will help me ALOT writing my essay, so thanks in advance.
FREUD (extract 1)
This good little boy, however, had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects he could get hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed and so on, so that hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he gave vent to a loud, long drawn out ‘o-o-o-o-o’, accompanied by an expression of interest and satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German word ‘fort’[‘gone’]. I eventually realised that this was a game and that the only use he made of his toys was to play ‘gone’ with them. One day I made an observation, which confirmed my view. The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of his cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o-o’. He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful ‘da’ [‘there’]. This, then, was the complete game…
The interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was related to the child’s great cultural achievement – the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction)which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach. It is of course a matter of indifference from the point of view of judging the effective nature of the game whether the child invented it himself or took it over from some outside suggestion. Our interest is directed to another point. The child cannot possibly have felt his mother’s departure as something agreeable or even indifferent. How does his repetition of this distressing experience as a game fit in with the pleasure principle?(pp. 14-15)
LACAN (extract 2)
We have only to understand the mirror-stage asan identification,in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image – whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago.
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infansstage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which theIis precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject.
This form would have to be called the Ideal-I,if we wished to incorporate it into our usual register, in the sense that it will also be the source of secondary idnetifications, under which term I would place the function of libidinal normalization. But the important point is that this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being(le devenir) of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his discordance with his own reality (pp. 2-3).