QUESTION Consider the Hotelling model of the competition between twofirms discussed in class. Select

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QUESTION Consider the Hotelling model of the competition between twofirms discussed in class. Select all that apply. QUESTION Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed inclass. Suppose bidders’ valuations are v1=10 andv2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits a bid b2=10.Then, in a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies bidder 1 must besubmitting a bid equal to _______. In this Nash equilibrium, bidder1’s payoff is equal to_______ (please, enter numerical values only,for example: 4). QUESTION Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzedin class. Suppose bidders’ valuations are v1=10 andv2=10. Select all that apply. QUESTION Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence gamediscussed in class. Assume that v1 = v2=100 and C=150, and selectall that apply. QUESTION Two countries produce oil. The per unit production cost ofCountry 1 is C1 = $2 and of country 2 it isC2 = $4. The total demand for oil is Q = 40-p where p isthe market price of a unit of oil. Each country can only produceeither 5 units, 10 units or 15 units. The total production of thetwo countries in a Nash equilibrium is . . .