# QUESTION Consider the Hotelling model of the competition between twofirms discussed in class. Select

QUESTION Consider the Hotelling model of the competition between twofirms discussed in class. Select all that apply. QUESTION Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed inclass. Suppose bidders’ valuations are v1=10 andv2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits a bid b2=10.Then, in a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies bidder 1 must besubmitting a bid equal to _______. In this Nash equilibrium, bidder1’s payoff is equal to_______ (please, enter numerical values only,for example: 4). QUESTION Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzedin class. Suppose bidders’ valuations are v1=10 andv2=10. Select all that apply. QUESTION Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence gamediscussed in class. Assume that v1 = v2=100 and C=150, and selectall that apply. QUESTION Two countries produce oil. The per unit production cost ofCountry 1 is C1 = $2 and of country 2 it isC2 = $4. The total demand for oil is Q = 40-p where p isthe market price of a unit of oil. Each country can only produceeither 5 units, 10 units or 15 units. The total production of thetwo countries in a Nash equilibrium is . . .